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Abstract
We show that Gabbay’s nonmonotonic consequence relations can be
reduced to a new family of relations, called entrenchment relations. En-
trenchment relations provide a direct generalization of epistemic entrench-
ment and expectation ordering introduced by Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson
for the study of belief revision and expectation inference, respectively.
1 Introduction
Nonmonotonicity has offered great promise as a logical foundation for knowledge
representation formalisms. The reason for such a promise is that nonmonotonic
logic allows “jumping” to conclusions, completes in a reasonable way our (in-
complete) knowledge and withdraws conclusions in the light of new information.
Therefore, most approaches to central problems of Artificial Intelligence, such
as belief revision, database updating, abduction and action planning, seem to
rely on one way or another to some form of nonmonotonic reasoning.
There are several proposals of logical systems performing nonmonotonic in-
ference. Among the most popular of them are: circumscription, negation as
failure, default logic, (fixed points of) various modal logics and inheritance sys-
tems. However, and despite the numerous results intertranslating one of the
above systems to the other, none of the above formalisms emerged as a domi-
nant logical framework under which all other nonmonotonic formalisms can be
classified, compared and reveal their logical content. This fact signifies that our
intuitions on the process of nonmonotonic inference are fragmented. Although,
all the above mentioned logics are worth be studied and employed as a cen-
tral inference mechanism they cannot serve as the place where finally our basic
intuitions about nonmonotonicity can rest.
∗Work supported by Training through Research Contract No. ERBFMBICT950324 be-
tween the European Community and Universita` degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza”.
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Addressing this problem, Gabbay in [Gab85] proposed to study nonmono-
tonic inference through Gentzen-like context sensitive sequents. Following this
proposal, a new line of research flourished by studying properties of the so-
called nonmonotonic consequence relations leading to a semantic characteri-
zation through (a generalization of) Shoham’s preferential models. This line
of research led to classification of several nonmonotonic formalisms and recog-
nized several logical properties properties that a nonmonotonic system should
desirably satisfy such as cumulativity or distributivity. However, there are two
disadvantages of this framework:
• nonmonotonic consequence relations express the sceptical inference of a
nonmonotonic proof system and therefore fail to describe nonmonotonicity
in its full generality, that is, the existence of multiple extensions.
• it does not seem that there is a straightforward way to design a nonmono-
tonic consequence relation from existing data unless they already encode
some short of conditional information (see [LM92]).
These two disadvantages suggest that a nonmonotonic consequence relation is
not a primitive notion but derived from a more basic inference mechanism.
In this paper, we shall introduce a novel framework for generating nonmono-
tonic inference, through a class of relations, called entrenchment relations . We
shall see that the framework of entrenchment relations is at least as expressive
than that of nonmonotonic consequence relations. In particular, nonmonotonic
consequence relations can be reduced to entrenchment relations (in the classi-
cal case) while the inference defined through entrenchment relations admits and
identifies the existence of multiple extensions. On the other hand, entrenchment
relations seem to build inference easily and from the bottom up. Simple fre-
quency data, from example generates easily at least one class of them (rational
orderings — see [AG96]).
Entrenchment relations are relations and will be denoted by . α  β will
be read as
β is at least as entrenched as α
in the sense that “α is more defeasible than β”. In other words, “if α is accepted
then so is β”. For example, consider the partial description of a (transitive)
entrenchment relation in Figure 1.
In that figure, a path upwards from α to β indicates that α  β, where 
denotes the entrenchment relation. The entrenchment relation of Figure 1 says
for example that ⊥ is less entrenched than all formulas, ¬f is less entrenched
than b, p and p ∧ f , and f is less entrenched than p.
How will an entrenchment relation be used for inference? The idea is simple.
We shall use entrenchment for excluding sentences.
A sentence α will infer (in a nonmonotonic way) another sentence β
if α together with a sentence γ, that is not less entrenched than ¬α,
(classically) imply β.
2
♣❍❍❍❍
♣
♣
✟✟✟✟
♣
❅
❅
❅
❅
♣
 
 
 
 
♣
⊤, p→ ¬f
¬p
¬b
¬f
⊥
f
Figure 1: A (transitive) entrenchment relation.
The reason we exclude sentences less entrenched than ¬α is that if we allow such
a sentence then we should also allow ¬α. However this will bring inconcistency.
For instance, using the above example and assuming p we should exclude ¬p,
¬b and ¬f . We remain with p → ¬f . Adding p → ¬f to the classical theory
of p we have that p nonmonotonically implies ¬f . Similarly, assuming b we
exclude ¬b and ¬f . We remain with ¬p and f . So, b nonmonotonically implies
f and ¬p. With no assumptions we have two consistent sets of sentences that
remain after excluding ⊥: {p → ¬f,¬p, f} and {p → ¬f,¬p,¬b,¬f}. There-
fore, it is possible to have more than one possibilities for extending the theory
of our assumptions and that leads to the well-known phenomenon of multiple
extensions.
It is clear that our framework separates nonmonotonic inference to two differ-
ent monotonic proof procedures: one positive and the other negative. The claim
that entrenchment relations is a useful concept towards our understanding of
nonmonotonicity will be substantiated by a series of representation results. We
shall show that Gabbay’s nonmonotonic consequences relations can be expressed
through entrenchment relations, and identify those classes of entrenchment re-
lations which correspond to the classes of nonmonotonic consequence relations
that have attracted special interest in the literature. In addition our framework
provides more:
• Uniformity. Inference defined through an entrenchment relation remains
the same throughout the above characterization.
• Monotonicity. Any strong cumulative nonmonotonic inference relies on a
monotonic (on both sides) entrenchment relation.
• Identification of multiple extensions . The way we define inference allows
the identification of multiple extensions. Therefore, both the sceptical
and credulous approach towards nonmonotonicity are expressible in our
framework.
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• A conceptually primitive view of nonmonotonicity. In our framework, a
nonmonotonic formalism separates into two logical mechanisms handling
positive and negative information.
Entrenchment relations provide a generalization of Ga¨rdenfors-Makinson’s
expectation orderings introduced for the characterization of expectation non-
monotonic consequence relations ([GM94]). This result was later extended to
rational consequence relations in [Geo96]. In [FadCHL94], incompletely speci-
fied expectation orderings were studied. But, to our knowledge, there is no study
of such relations outside the non-Horn classes of nonmonotonic consequence re-
lations. This paper fills exactly this gap by showing that all nonmonotonic
consequence relations can be represented through entrenchment relations.
However, entrenchment relations have a close relative in the study of belief
revision, called epistemic entrenchments ([GM88]). Epistemic entrenchments
proved to be a very useful for belief revision and became the standard tool ([])
for studying the AGM postulates ([AGM85]). Moreover, generalizations of epis-
temic entrenchment have been proposed by Lindstro¨m-Rabinowicz ([LR91]) and
Rott ([Rot92]). They both proposed to drop linearity from epistemic entrench-
ment. Lindstro¨m-Rabinowicz used such a partial ordering for the study of rela-
tional belief revision. On the other hand, Rott’s generalized epistemic entrench-
ments, use the original Ga¨rdenfors-Makinson syntactic translation for generating
belief revision functions. As a consquence, Rott characterizes non-Horn belief
revision functions with Horn epistemic entrenchments and vice versa. There-
fore, our results cannot be derived, even through a suitable translation, by the
above works, although intuition and motivation should be credited on both of
them.
Relations of expectation orderings with other systems performing some sort
of nonmonotonic reasoning are abundant ([Bou92a],[Bou92b],[Lam91],[Lam92],[Wob92],[DP91]),
such as Pearl’s system Z ([Pea90]), conditional logic ([Sta68],[Lew73]), and pos-
sibilistic logic ([DP88]). It is worth mentioning that orderings appear abun-
dantly in the literature of nonmonotonic logic. Orderings of models lead to
the preferential model framework ([Sho88],[KLM90],[KS91],[Mak94]), while or-
dering of sentences lead to prioritization. Most nonmonotonic formalisms have
been enriched with priority handling. However, entrenchment relations are not
priorities but rather rules for extending a special form of priority statements.
The connection of priority statements with entrenchment relations are similar
to that of sequents with proof rules.
The further contents of this paper are as follows. In Section 2, we present
entrenchment relations. We discuss their informal meaning and present vari-
ous properties of them. Then, in Section 3, we define the notion of maxicon-
sistent and weak maxiconsistent inference as derived from a pair of relations.
Both inference schemes can generate all nonmonotonic consequence relations.
In Section 4, we review nonmonotonic consequence relations and present our
representation results. In Section 5, we summarize.
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2 entrenchment Relations
Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson recently showed ([GM94]) that the study of a strong
non-Horn class of nonmonotonic consequence relations, called entrenchment
inference relations , can be reduced to the study of a particular class of lin-
ear preorders among sentences called entrenchment orderings. Subsequently,
in [Geo96], the author extended this result to the well-known Lehmann and
Magidor’s class of rational inference relations ([LM92]). The purpose of this
paper is to show that the study of all nonmonotonic consequence relations can
be reduced to the study of relations among sentences which generalize the class
of above mentioned orderings.
The interpretation of entrenchment orderings which Ga¨rdenfors and Makin-
son proved equivalent to entrenchment inference relations is the following. As-
sume there is an ordering  of the sentences of a propositional language L,
where α  β means “β is at least as entrenched as α” or “β is at least as
surprising as α”. Therefore,  is a relation comparing degrees of defeasibility
among sentences.
This interpretation of , as well as a similar one based on possibility given
in [FadCHL94], although seems fit for the particular class of nonmonotonic in-
ferences it characterizes, has in our opinion the following disadvantages. First,
it has a complicated flavor by relying on notions such as expectation, defeasibil-
ity, and surprise that are far from primitive. Second, it points to a semantical
interpretation by committing to a subjective evaluation of sentences and there-
fore is lacking the proof-theoretic interpretation meant for relations generating
inference. Finally, this interpretation loses its plausibility once we weaken one
of its defining properties (for example linearity or transitivity) and restricts us
to a unique class of orderings.
Entrenchment relations are nothing more than a generalization of the above
ordering. We will drop first linearity of the preorder, for characterizing pref-
erential inference, and subsequently transitivity. Note that the entrenchment
interpretation is weakened once we drop transitivity: if a sentence α is less en-
trenched than β and β less entrenched than γ, then α should be less entrenched
than γ. However, inference through an entrenchment relation remains the same,
that is we still exclude sentences that relate to ¬α, i.e. β  ¬α. Therefore the
notion of entrenchment becomes contextual. The situation is similar to that
of a consequence relation that it is not necessarily monotonic, that is, just as
α ∼ γ but not neseccarily β ∼ γ whenever β ⊢ α. However, our representation
remains useful as we can express multiple extensions.
Here are our assumptions on the language. We assume a language L of
propositional constants closed under the boolean connectives ∨ (disjunction),
∧ (conjunction), ¬ (negation) and → (implication). We use greek letters α, β,
γ, etc. for propositional variables. We also assume an underlying consequence
relation that it will act as the underlying proof-theoretic mechanism. For all
practical purposes, it can be thought as classical propositional calculus, but all
following definitions and theorems can be carried out in any consequence relation
⊢⊆ 2L×L that includes classical propositional logic, satisfies compactness (i.e.,
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ifX ⊢ β then there exists a finite subset Y ofX such that Y ⊢ β)1, the deduction
theorem (i.e., X,α ⊢ β if and only if X ⊢ α → β) and disjunction in premises
(i.e., if X,α ⊢ β and X, γ ⊢ β then X,α ∨ γ ⊢ β). We denote the consequences
of α with Cn(α). We should add that nonmonotonic inference which does not
contain classical tautologies is a rather rare exemption.
Now, let us assume a relation  between sentences of L. α  β should be
interpreted as
β is (at least) as entrenched as α.
Now, read  as depending on β, that is as a unary predicate indexed by β.
Therefore, if we strengthen the left part we expect this relation to hold. On the
other hand, sentences on the right of express context , so properties imposed on
that part translate to our conception of context. We can be either monotonic
or non-monotonic on context. We will see that either way can still generate
nonmonotonic inference. What then would the properties of  be? We shall
assume the following three basic properties:
1. α  α (Reflexivity)
2. If α ⊢ β and β  γ then α  γ. (Left Monotonicity)
3. If α ⊢ β and β ⊢ α then γ  α iff γ  β. (Logical Equivalence)
The meaning of Reflexivity is straightforward.
Left Monotonicity says that if β is less entrenched then γ so is any sentence
stronger than β.
Finally, Logical Equivalence says that two logically equivalent sentences (un-
der ⊢) construct the same context and therefore if a sentence is less entrenched
than one of them must be less entrenched than the other as well.
We summarize the above in the following definition of entrenchment frame.
Definition 1 An entrenchment frame is a pair 〈L,⊢,〉, where  is a relation
on L×L, called entrenchment relation, that satisfies the above properties, that
is Reflexivity, Left Monotonicity and Logical Equivalence.
All properties of entrenchment relations mentioned in the subsequent appear
on Table 1.
The following property has been considered in the framework of entrench-
ment orderings ([GM94])
If α ⊢ β then α  β. (Dominance)
In view of Reflexivity, Left Monotonicity implies Dominance. Given Dominance
and Reflexivity of ⊢, Reflexivity of  follows. Dominance is a very useful prop-
erty that is used abundantly in the subsequent and was in fact one of the defining
properties of Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson’s entrenchment ordering and epistemic
entrenchment.
The following property is derived by Left Monotonicity
1We write X,α ⊢ β for X ∪ {α} ⊢ β.
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α  α (Reflexivity)
α ⊢ β β  γ
α  γ
(Left Monotonicity)
α ⊢ β
α  β
(Dominance)
α ⊢ β β ⊢ α γ  α
γ  β
(Logical Equivalence)
α ∨ β  β α ∨ β  α α ∨ γ  α
β ∨ γ  β
(Weak Equivalence)
α  β β  α γ  α
γ  β
(Equivalence)
α ∨ β  α α ∨ γ  α
α ∨ β ∨ γ  α
(Weak Left Disjunction)
β  α γ  α
β ∨ γ  α
(Left Disjunction)
α ∨ β ∨ γ  α ∨ β α ∨ β  α
α ∨ γ  α
(Weak Bounded Cut)
γ  α ∨ β β  α
γ  α
(Bounded Cut)
α ∨ γ  α α ∨ β  α
α ∨ β ∨ γ  α ∨ β
(Weak Bounded Right Monotonicity)
γ  α β  α
γ  α ∨ β
(Bounded Right Monotonicity)
α0  αn αn  αn−1 · · · α1  α0
αn  α0
(Acyclicity)
α0 ∨ α1  α0 α1 ∨ α2  α1 · · · αn ∨ α0  αn
α0 ∨ αn  α0
(Weak Acyclicity)
α  β β ⊢ γ
α  γ
(Right Monotonicity)
γ  α γ  β
γ  α ∧ β
(Right Conjunction)
α  β β  γ
α  γ
(Transitivity)
α  β or β  α (Connectivity)
Table 1: Properties for entrenchment relations
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α ⊢ β and β ⊢ α implies α  γ iff β  γ.
While Left Monotonicity allows us to strengthen arbitrarily sentences on the
left, Bounded Left Disjunction and Left Disjunction allow us to weaken them.
These properties amount to a disjunction property. An entrenchment relation
will be called disjunctive (weak disjunctive) if it satisfies Left Disjunction (Weak
Left Disjunction). Similarly, for entrenchment frames.
The definition of entrenchment frame says nothing about how one should go
combining sentences on the right, i.e., combining contexts. Bounded Cut and
Right Conjunction express our ability to strengthen the right part so strengthen
the context. Bounded Right Monotonicity, Right Monotonicity and Weak Right
Monotonicity weaken the right part so weaken the context. It is worth noting
that Right Conjunction makes a sentence, less entrenched than another sentence
and its negation, less entrenched than all sentences. Right conjunction allow
us to combine contexts using conjunction. Bounded Right Monotonicity follows
from Right Monotonicity. Weak Bounded Right Monotonicity together with
Bounded Cut implies Weak Left Disjunction.
Weak Bounded Right Monotonicity and Weak Bounded Cut together are
equivalent to Weak Equivalence.
Bounded Cut and Bounded Right Monotonicity together imply Equivalence.
While given Left Disjunction, Equivalence implies Bounded Cut and Bounded
Right Monotonicity.
Observe that Transitivity implies Right Monotonicity, and thus Bounded
Right Monotonicity. Transitivity is equivalent to Right Monotonicity given
Bounded Cut. Transitivity and Dominance implies Left Monotonicity.
Connectivity is the only non-Horn property among the above properties.
Therefore, any class of entrenchment connectivity relations satisfying the above
properties except Connectivity is closed under intersections. Ga¨rdenfors and
Makinson merged Connectivity and Right Conjunction into
α  α ∧ β or β  α ∧ β. (Conjunctiveness)
and along with Dominance and Transitivity make the defining set of properties
of Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson’s entrenchment orderings which is the notion we
generalize.
In this paper, we will only study Horn properties. To our knowledge previous
results concern only non-Horn entrenchment relations satisfying connectivity:
entrenchment and rational ordering in [GM94] and [Geo96], respectively.
3 Maxiconsistent and Weak Maxiconsistent In-
ference
We shall now describe an inference scheme based on an entrenchment relation
. We will define two finitary consequence relation, that is subsets of L × L,
called maxiconsistent (∼ ) and weak maxiconsistent inference (∼w ).
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Our notion of inference is based on maxiconsistency. The idea of using
maximal consistent sets for inference is not new. Maximal consistent sets have
been used in databases ([FUV83]), conditional logic ([Res64], [Vel76], [Kra81],
[Gin86]), and belief revision ([AGM85]). However, the notion of maximal con-
sistency is already present in classical entailment. In order to compute the
inferences of a formula α, one can find all maximal consistent sets that do not
contain ¬α, that is all prime filters containing α, and take their intersection.
This is the filter that contains all theorems of α. Our definition of inference
is similar. First, we find all maximal consistent sets whose elements do not
have lower entrenchment than ¬α. These sets do not necessarily contain α, as
opposed, say, to classical logic. Next, we consider their intersection. If α→ β is
contained in this intersection then α entails maxiconsistently β, that is α∼ β.
It is time to be more formal.
Definition 2 Let U be a set of formulas and α ∈ L. Then the α-conditionalization
Uα of U is the set
Uα = {α→ β | β ∈ U}.
Lemma 3 Let U, V be deductively closed (under ⊢). We have the following
1. U = V iff Uα = V α.
2. Cn(Uα, α) = Cn(U, α).
Definition 4 Let 〈L,⊢,〉 be an entrenchment frame. The set of coherent
sentences for a formula α ∈ L is the set
Coh(α) = {β | β 6 ¬α}.
The base of α is the set
B(α) = {U | U = Cn(U), U ⊆ Coh(α)}.
The weak base of α is the set
Bw(α) = {U | U = Cn(U), Uα ⊆ Coh(α)}.
The maximal base of α is the set
Bmax(α) = {U | U ∈ B(α) and if U
′ = Cn(U ′) with U ⊂ U ′ then U ′ 6∈ B(α)}.
The maximal weak base of α is the set
Bw
max
(α) = {U | Uα ∈ Bw(α) and if V = Cn(V ) with Uα ⊂ V α then V α 6∈ Bw(α)}.
The extension set of α is the set
e(α) = {Cn(U, α) | U ∈ Bmax(α)},
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while the weak extension set of α is the set
ew(α) = {U | U ∈ Bw
max
(α)},
The sceptical extension of α is the set
E(α) =
⋂
e(α),
and the sceptical weak extension of α is the set
Ew(α) =
⋂
ew(α).
Now define
α∼ β iff β ∈ E(α),
and say that α maxiconsistently infers β in the entrenchment frame 〈L,⊢,〉.
Also, define
α∼w β iff β ∈ E
w(α),
and say that α weak maxiconsistently infers β in the entrenchment frame 〈L,⊢
,〉.
Since L and ⊢ remain fixed throughout the following we shall usually drop
〈L,⊢,〉 and refer to maxiconsistent inference on an entrenchment consequence
relation .
Note, that if  is ⊢, that is, if we equate an entrenchment relation with
classical provability then both ∼ and ∼w collapse to classical ⊢.
The following lemma deals with inconsistency. In fact, an entrenchment
frame is defined in such a way so that it isolates inconsistency. Also, this
lemma ensures that whatever theory remains after excluding sets of sentences
is consistent. Therefore, bases and weak bases of a sentence α contain only
consistent sets with α.
Lemma 5 Given an entrenchment frame 〈L,⊢,〉, the following hold
1. If β ∈ Coh(α) then β 6⊢ ¬α.
2. If U ⊆ Coh(α) and U = Cn(U) then U, α 6⊢ ⊥, i.e. U is consistent with
α.
3. If Uα ⊆ Coh(α) then U, α 6⊢ ⊥, i.e. U is consistent with α.
4. If U ∈ Bw
max
(α) then α ∈ U .
In the following, we give conditions under which inconsistency is maxicon-
sistently derivable.
Lemma 6 Given an entrenchment frame 〈L,⊢,〉, then
α∼ ⊥ iff Coh(α) = ∅ iff ⊤  ¬α iff β  ¬α, for all β ∈ L.
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Note that the above Lemma stiil holds if we replace ∼ with ∼w .
Next we state several properties that maxiconsistent inference entails in a
entrenchment frame which will be very useful in the following.
Lemma 7 Given an entrenchment frame 〈L,⊢,〉, the following hold
1. If β ∈ Coh(α) then Cn(β) ⊆ Coh(α).
2. If α∼ β then α→ ¬β  ¬α.
3. If α∼ β then ¬β  ¬α.
4. If  is disjunctive then α  β is equivalent to α ∨ β  β.
The corresponding lemma to the above lemma for weak maxiconsistent in-
ference is the following.
Lemma 8 Given an entrenchment frame 〈L,⊢,〉, the following hold
1. If α→ β ∈ Coh(α) then Cn(β) ∈ Bw(α).
2. If α∼w β then α→ ¬β  ¬α.
3. If α∼w β then ¬β  ¬α.
Bases and weak bases relate to each other through the following lemma.
Lemma 9 Given an entrenchment frame 〈L,⊢,〉, the following hold
1. If U ∈ Bmax(α) then Cn(U, α) ∈ Bw(α).
2. If U ∈ Bw
max
(α) then Cn(Uα) ⊆ Coh(α).
Note that in Part 1, we do not have Cn(U, α) ∈ Bw
max
(α). Otherwise, the
two notions of maxiconsistent inference would collapse to each other.
The following lemma shows how different properties of an entrenchment
relation translate to corresponding properties of bases in an entrenchment frame.
Lemma 10 Given an entrenchment frame 〈L,⊢,〉, the following hold
1. If α ⊢ β and β ⊢ α imply Coh(α) = Coh(β) = Coh(α ∧ β).
2. If  satisfies Bounded Cut then ¬β  ¬α implies Coh(α) ⊆ Coh(α ∧ β)
(so B(α) ⊆ B(α ∧ β)).
3. If  satisfies Bounded Right Monotonicity then ¬β  ¬α implies Coh(α∧
β) ⊆ Coh(α) (so B(α ∧ β) ⊆ B(α)).
4. If  satisfies Bounded Cut and Bounded Right Monotonicity then ¬β  ¬α
implies Coh(α ∧ β) = Coh(α) (so B(α) = B(α ∧ β)).
5. If  satisfies Right Monotonicity then α ⊢ β implies Coh(α) ⊆ Coh(β)
(so B(α) ⊆ B(β)).
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The corresponding lemma for weak bases is the following.
Lemma 11 Given an entrenchment frame 〈L,⊢,〉, the following hold
1. If α ⊢ β and β ⊢ α imply Bw(α) = Bw(β) = Bw(α ∧ β).
2. If  satisfies Weak Bounded Cut then ¬α ∨ ¬β  ¬α implies Bw(α) ⊆
Bw(α ∧ β).
3. If  satisfies Weak Bounded Right Monotonicity then ¬α ∨ ¬β  ¬α
implies
Bw(α ∧ β) ⊆ Bw(α).
4. If  satisfies Weak Bounded Cut and Weak Bounded Right Monotonicity
then ¬α ∨ ¬β  ¬α implies Bw(α ∧ β) = Bw(α).
5. If  satisfies Weak Right Monotonicity then α ⊢ β implies Bw(α) ⊆
Bw(β).
The following lemmas and theorems are the most important of this section.
They provide us with the converse of Lemma 7 and 8. Through these results
we are able to reduce the problem of deciding maxiconsistent inference in to
a problem of deciding an entrenchment relation. For that we assume that the
entrenchment frame is either disjunctive or weak disjunctive.
Lemma 12 Let  be a weak disjunctive entrenchment relation. Then
1. ¬α ∨ ¬β  ¬α iff α∼w β.
2. If  satisfies, in addition, Transitivity and Right Conjunction then ¬α ∨
¬β  ¬α implies α∼ β.
Given the above lemma, we can state the connection between maxiconsistent
and weak maxiconsistent inference on a weak disjunctive entrenchment frame.
Theorem 13 Let  be a weak disjunctive entrenchment relation. Then
1. α∼ β implies α∼w β.
2. If  satisfies, in addition, Transitivity and Right Conjunction then α∼w β
implies α∼ β.
The following theorem shows that, for disjunctive entrenchment relations,
maxiconsistent inference is decided by a kind of contraposition. We have that
α maxiconsistently infers β if “¬β is less entrenched than ¬α”.
Theorem 14 Let  be a disjunctive entrenchment relation. Then
¬β  ¬α if and only if α∼ β.
The following corollary says that maxiconsistent and weak maxiconsistent
inference coincide on disjunctive entrenchment frames.
Corollary 15 Let  be a disjunctive entrenchment relation. Then
α∼ β if and only if α∼w β.
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4 Nonmonotonic Consequence Relations and their
Representations
A recent breakthrough in nonmonotonic logic is the beginning of study of non-
monotonic consequence through postulates for abstract nonmonotonic conse-
quence relations, using Gentzen-like context-sensitive sequents ([Gab85], [Mak89],
[KLM90]). The outcome of this research turns out to be valuable in at least two
ways
• it provides a sufficiently general axiomatic framework for comparing and
classifying nonmonotonic formalisms, and
• it gave rise to new, simpler, and better behaved systems for nonmonotonic
reasoning, such as cumulative ([Gab85]), preferential ([KLM90]), and ra-
tional ([LM92]) inference relations.
In this paper, we shall present a variety of representations results for non-
monotonic consequence relations through maxiconsistent inference on entrench-
ment frames.
Before presenting the results of this section (and main results of this paper),
we shall define a variety of classes of nonmonotonic consequence relations. The
rules mentioned in the following are presented in Table 2. For a motivation
of these rules see [KLM90] and [Mak94]. (The latter serves as an excellent
introduction to nonmonotonic consequence relations.)
Definition 16 Following ([KLM90], [LM92], [GM94]), we shall say that a
relation ∼ on L is a nonmonotonic consequence relation (based on ⊢) if it
satisfies Supraclassicality, Left Logical Equivalence, Right Weakening, and And.
We call a nonmonotonic consequence relation ∼ cumulative if it satisfies, in
addition, Cut and Cautious Monotonicity, strongly cumulative if it is cumulative
and satisfies, in addition, Loop, preferential if it is cumulative and satisfies, in
addition, Or, and rational if it is preferential and satisfies, in addition, Rational
Monotonicity.
The most controversial of these rules is Rational Monotony, which, moreover,
is non-Horn. For a plausible counterexample, see [Sta94].
The class of nonmonotonic consequence relations is too general and therefore
very weak. The class of default inference relations contains sceptical inference
of Reiter’s default systems [Rei80]. Poole systems with constraints ([Poo88])
and cumulative default systems such as the one appeared in [Bre91] belong to
the class of cumulative inference relations. Strong cumulativity has no concrete
formalism, as far as we know. Inference defined on Poole systems without
constraints as well as entailment on classical preferential models belong to the
class of preferential inference relations. Finally, ranked operators ([Geo95]), as
well as, the AGM belief revision operator belong to the class of rational inference
relations.
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α ⊢ β
α∼ β
(Supraclassicality)
α ⊢ β β ⊢ γ α∼ γ
β ∼ γ
(Left Logical Equivalence)
α∼ β β ⊢ γ
α∼ γ
(Right Weakening)
α∼ β α∼ γ
α∼ β ∧ γ
(And)
α∼ β α ∧ β ∼ γ
α∼ γ
(Cut)
α∼ β α∼ γ
α ∧ β ∼ γ
(Cautious Monotonicity)
α0 ∼ α1 · · · αn−1 ∼ αn αn ∼ α0
α0 ∼ αn
(Loop)
α∼ γ β ∼ γ
α ∨ β ∼ γ
(Or)
α ∨ ∼ β β ∨ γ ∼ β
α ∨ γ ∼ α
(Weak Transitivity)
α 6∼ ¬β α∼ γ
α ∧ β ∼ γ
(Rational Monotonicity)
Table 2: Rules for Nonmonotonic Inference
4.1 Maxiconsistent Inference
The first theorem of this section shows that maxiconsistent inference in an ar-
bitrary entrenchment frame is a nonmonotonic consequence relation. All subse-
quent results assume that the entrenchment frame is either disjunctive or weak
disjunctive.
Theorem 17 Let 〈L,⊢,〉 be a entrenchment frame. Then its maxiconsistent
inference ∼ is a nonmonotonic consequence relation. Moreover,
1. If  satisfies Bounded Cut and Bounded Right Monotonicity then ∼ is
a cumulative inference relation.
2. If  satisfies Bounded Cut and Right Monotonicity then ∼ is a strong
cumulative inference relation.
3. If  satisfies Transitivity and Right Conjunction then ∼ is a preferential
inference relation.
From now on, we will assume a disjunctive entrenchment relation. The maxi-
consistent inference of a disjunctive entrenchment relation will give a canonical
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representation of nonmonotonic consequence relation. The following definitions
provide, for each nonmonotonic consequence relation, an entrenchment relation
with the same maxiconsistent inference, and conversely.
Definition 18 Given an entrenchment relation and a nonmonotonic inference
relation ∼ , then define a consequence relation ∼ ′ and a relation ′ as follows
(N) α ∼ ′β iff ¬β  ¬α
(P ) α ′ β iff ¬β ∼ ¬α.
We shall also denote ∼ ′ and ′ with N() or and P ( ∼ ), respectively.
Given the above definition one can prove the following lemma
Lemma 19 Let  and ∼ be an entrenchment and a nonmonotonic conse-
quence relation, respectively. Then
1. P (N()) =, and
2. N(P ( ∼ )) = ∼ .
Corollary 20 Let  be a disjunctive entrenchment relation. Then
N() = ∼ ,
where ∼ is the maxiconsistent inference of .
We have the following
Theorem 21 Let 〈L,⊢,〉 be a disjunctive entrenchment frame. Then the in-
ference relation ∼ defined by N is a nonmonotonic consequence relation such
that, for all α, β in L,
α ∼ β iff α∼ β.
Moreover, if  satisfies Bounded Cut, Bounded Right Monotonicity, Acyclicity
and Conjunction then ∼ satisfies Cut, Cautious Monotonicity, Loop and Or,
respectively.
Going from nonmonotonic consequence relations to disjunctive entrenchment
relations, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 22 Let ∼ be a nonmonotonic inference relation, then the relation
 defined by (P ) is a disjunctive entrenchment relation such that, for all α, β
in L,
α ∼ β iff α∼ β.
Moreover, if ∼ satisfies Cut, Cautious Monotonicity, Loop, and Or then  sat-
isfies Bounded Cut, Bounded Right Monotonicity, Acyclicity, and Conjunction,
respectively.
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4.2 Weak Maxiconsistent Inference
In this section, we will study weak maxiconsistent inference on weak disjunctive
entrenchment frames. This will allow us to find better behaved entrenchment
relations equivalent with a given nonmonotonic consequence relation. First,
a theorem analogous to Theorem 17 which shows that weak maxiconsistent
inference is nonmonotonic.
Theorem 23 Let 〈L,⊢,〉 be a entrenchment frame. Then its weak maxicon-
sistent inference ∼w is a nonmonotonic consequence relation.
As in the previous section, we will define maps between the classes of non-
monotonic consequence relations and weak disjunctive entrenchment relations,
and conversely.
Definition 24 Given an entrenchment relation  and a nonmonotonic infer-
ence relation ∼ , then define a consequence relation ∼ ′ and a relation ′ as
follows
(N→) α ∼
′
β iff ¬α ∨ ¬β  ¬α
(P→) α ′ β iff ¬α ∨ ¬β ∼ ¬α.
(Ptr) α ′′ β iff there exist δ1, . . . , δn ∈ L such that
¬β ∼ δ1, δ1 ∼ δ2, . . . , δn ∼ ¬α.
We shall also denote ∼ ′, ′ and ′′ with N→(), P→( ∼ ) and Ptr( ∼ ), re-
spectively.
Given the above definition one can prove the following lemma
Lemma 25 Let  be an entrenchment relation and ∼ a nonmonotonic con-
sequence relation. Then
1. if  satisfies Right Monotonicity and Right Conjunction then
P→(N→()) =,
2. N→(P→( ∼ )) = ∼ ,
3. if  is transitive then Ptr(N→()) =, and
4. if ∼ satisfies Loop then N→(Ptr( ∼ )) = ∼ .
Corollary 26 Let  be a weak disjunctive entrenchment relation. Then
N→() = ∼w ,
where ∼w is the weak maxiconsistent inference of .
We now have the following
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Theorem 27 Let 〈L,⊢,〉 be a weak disjunctive entrenchment frame. Then
the inference relation ∼ defined by N→ is a nonmonotonic consequence relation
such that, for all α, β in L,
α ∼ β iff α∼w β.
Moreover, if  satisfies Weak Bounded Cut, Weak Bounded Right Monotonic-
ity, Weak Acyclicity and Right Conjunction then ∼w satisfies Cut, Cautious
Monotonicity, Loop and Or, respectively.
We do not have a similar theorem to Theorem 22 because an arbitrary
nonmonotonic consequence relation does not define an entrenchment relation
through (P→). However, it does so if we assume that it is preferential .
Theorem 28 Let ∼ be a preferential inference relation, then the relation 
defined by (P→) is a weak disjunctive and transitive entrenchment relation sat-
isfying Conjunction such that, for all α, β in L,
α ∼ β iff α∼ β iff α∼w β.
We can characterize strong cumulative inference relations through weak
maxiconsistent inference, if we employ (Ptr).
Theorem 29 Let ∼ be a nonmonotonic consequence relation satisfying Loop,
then the relation  defined by (Ptr) is a weak disjunctive transitive entrenchment
relation such that, for all α, β in L,
α ∼ β iff α∼w β.
5 Conclusion
In this section, we will give a summary of the correspondence between classes
of entrenchment and nonmonotonic consequence relations.
Let A be a class of nonmonotonic consequence relations and B a class of
entrenchment relations. Let C,Cw be maps from B to A with C() = ∼ and
C
w() = ∼w , respectively, where ∼ an ∼
w
 are the maxiconsistent and weak
maxiconsistent inference on .
We will say that a class A of nonmonotonic consequence relations is dual to a
class B of entrenchment relations and denote it with A ≡ B if there exists a map
N such that N : B → A, C ◦ N = IdA, and N ◦ C = IdB, where Id is the identity
map. Similarly, A and B will be weakly dual and we denote it with A
w
≡ B if
there exists a map N such that N : B → A, Cw ◦ N = IdA, and N ◦ Cw = IdB.
We will say that a class A of nonmonotonic consequence relations is a retract
of a class B of entrenchment relations and denote it with A |≡ B if there exists
a map N such that N : B → A and C ◦ N = IdA. Similarly, A is a weak retract
of B and we denote it with A |
w
≡ B if there exists a map N such that N : B → A
and Cw ◦ N = IdA.
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NM = all nonmonotonic consequence relations (nmcr)
D = nmcr satisfying Cut
CM = nmcr satisfying Cautious Monotonicity
C = cumulative nmcr
SC = strong cumulative nmcr
P = preferential nmcr
E = all entrenchment relations (er)
BC = er satisfying Bounded Cut
BR = er satisfying Bounded Right Monotonicity
BCR = er satisfying Bounded Cut and Bounded Right Monotonicity
BA = er satisfying Bounded Cut, Bounded Right Monotonicity,
and Acyclicity
T = er satisfying Transitivity
TC = er satisfying Transitivity and Right Conjunction
d-B = er satisfying the properties of B and Left Disjunction
wd-B = er satisfying the properties of B and Weak Left Disjunction
Table 3: Classes of nonmonotonic and entrenchment relations
A list of all classes of nonmonotonic and entrenchment relations mentioned
in the following appear on Table 3
The classes of nonmonotonic consequence relations relate to each other
through the following scheme (right to left direction denotes inclusion).
✟✟
✟✟
❍❍❍❍ ✟✟
✟✟
❍❍❍❍
CM
PSCCNM
D
Similarly, the classes of entrenchment relations relate to each other as follows.
✟✟
✟✟
❍❍❍❍ ✟✟
✟✟
❍❍❍❍
BCR
BC
BR
BA TCE
Moreover, If B is any entrenchment relation class then d-B and wd-B are
B augmented with Left Disjunction and Weak Left Disjunction, respectively.
Clearly, d-B ⊆ wd-B ⊆ B.
We now have the following corollary
Corollary 30 The following hold
1. NM ≡ d-E, NM
w
≡ d-E, NM |≡ E, NM |
w
≡ E, and NM |≡ wd-E.
2. D ≡ d-BC and D
w
≡ d-BC.
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3. CM ≡ d-BR and CM
w
≡ d-BR.
4. C ≡ d-BCR, C
w
≡ d-BCR, C |≡ BCR and C |
w
≡ BCR.
5. SC ≡ d-BA, SC
w
≡ d-BA and SC
w
≡ wd-T.
6. P |≡ d-TC, P ≡ wd-TC and P
w
≡ wd-TC.
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